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Intergovernmental transfers of financial resources have long been a dominant feature in 
the federally structured countries. The most critical aspect of such federal transfers is to deal 
with the existing imbalances between different levels of governments that have assigned 
different fiscal powers. In India, the structural imbalance of financial resource mobilization 
between central (national) and state (subnational) governments, referred as vertical imbalance, 
has existed right from the beginning because the Constitution provides quasi-federation with 
more power to the centre for allocation of resources. In contrast, the states at subnational level 
have assigned major expenditure responsibilities such as law and public order, agriculture, 
public health and education, several infrastructural contraction, etc. due to their proximity to 
the local issues. Furthermore, with the adoption of developmental planning and emphasis on 
decentralized fiscal activities, the role of subnational governments to provide better social and 
economic services has widened. Seeing that the resource mobilization powers assigned to 
subnational states fall short of their expenditure responsibilities, the states are therefore 
dependent on central government for financial resources. Consequently, the fiscal management 
of states to a large extent is shaped by the central devolution of funds and expenditure 
commitments that arise from time to time. 
 
Nevertheless, the states are themselves unequal in terms of resource mobilizations at 
subnational level. Such an inequality is termed as horizontal imbalance and is caused by the 
statewide variations in revenue generations and expenditure responsibilities since there are 
region-specific disparities and diverse socioeconomic structure among them. In spite of that the 
fiscal stance of state governments in general is attained focus in most public debates since later 
half of the eighties when states are started experiencing fiscal imbalances. Notably, the fiscal 
policy of states deems as imperative in national macroeconomic policies because the states 
account for around sixty percent in combined expenditure by central and states governments. 
In view of the growing importance of subnational financial patterns in economy as well as 
reformative intergovernmental transfer systems over time, there are very extensive researches 
on the issue of fiscal federalism in India. In fact, there are enormous studies over the last two 
decades to review critically the existing patterns of vertical and horizontal devolution of 
resources (Bagchi and Chakraborty, 2004; Chakraborty, 2010; Chalam and Mishra, 1997; Ghosh, 
et al., 2011; Hajra, et al., 2008; Kurian, 2008; Ramalingom and Kurup, 1991; Rangarajan and 
Srivastava, 2008; Rao, 2002; Srivastava, 2010; Vidwans, 1999; etc.). The present study is rather 
different from those since our endeavor here is to offer an estimate for statewide contribution 
in central resource pool and compare it to their receipt as central transfers. This is indeed an 
important moral economic issue that the study attempts to find out using budgetary data of 
national and subnational governments over the last three decades. Clearly, the study intends to 
identify whether there exists any long run stability in the pattern of federal transfers of financial 
resource between centre to state (flow of funds from the centre to a state’s revenue) and state 
to centre (flow of funds from a state to the centre’s revenue)? In econometric sense, this is to 
be accomplished by examining the cointegration of state specific contribution in and return 
from central resource pool. The remainder part is organized as follows. First, we offer a brief 
review of statewide comparative fiscal health involving the deficit indicators, and then realize 
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the trend of federal transfers for growing expenditures need of states in India. Nevertheless, 
the modeling of statewide contribution in central resource pool, and the empirical 
methodologies on advanced time series econometrics to deal with the issue of long run 
equilibrium of fiscal transfers are explored thereafter. Subsequently, the results and discussion 
on stability of fiscal transfers are presented, followed by the conclusions. 
 
Review of fiscal stance and pattern of federal transfers for the states in India 
Pattern of states fiscal health 
 
The fiscal shape of constitutional states at subnational level may well be observed by 
the two broad indicators – revenue and fiscal deficits1 – in their public budget. Accordingly, the 
states are ranked on their average scores for the indicators normalized by state level output 
(GSDP) in two reference periods – first half of 1980s (may be marked as the before scenario of 
major fiscal imbalances for states) and second half of 2000s (referred as current scenario of 
enacting fiscal responsibility and budgetary management for the states). As depicted in table 1, 
Kerala, Punjab and West Bengal are the bottom three states in RD-GSDP term during current 
period (second half of 2000s). However, in first half of 1980s, the state of Orissa placed in 
bottom position instead of Punjab during 2000s: II. Interestingly, Orissa reaches to the top from 
bottom over time. Further, Madhya Pradesh is the only state that consistently scored as toper 
in both 1980s: I and 2000s: II. In GFD-GSDP term, however, Tamil Nadu is maintained the 
topness over time. On the other hand, Utter Pradesh retains in the bottomness over time. 
Again interestingly, West Bengal currently drops to the bottomness from its topness in 1980s: I. 
 
Table 1: Ranking of states as per the deficit indicators 
 
As per RD-GSDP ratio As per GFD-GSDP ratio 
2000s: II 1980s: I 2000s: II 1980s: I 
To
p
-3
 Bihar Madhya Pradesh Orissa Tamil Nadu 
Madhya Pradesh Haryana Haryana Kerala 
Orissa Gujarat Tamil Nadu West Bengal 
M
id
d
le
-8
 
Karnataka Punjab Maharashtra Andhra Pradesh 
Uttar Pradesh Tamil Nadu Karnataka Maharashtra 
Tamil Nadu Uttar Pradesh Gujarat Karnataka 
Haryana Karnataka Madhya Pradesh Gujarat 
Andhra Pradesh Bihar Andhra Pradesh Haryana 
Maharashtra Rajasthan Rajasthan Orissa 
Gujarat Maharashtra Kerala Punjab 
Rajasthan Andhra Pradesh Bihar Rajasthan 
B
o
tt
o
m
-3
 
Kerala Orissa Punjab Uttar Pradesh 
Punjab Kerala Uttar Pradesh Madhya Pradesh 
West Bengal West Bengal West Bengal Bihar 
 
The study therefore considers seven states, namely Kerala, Punjab, West Bengal, Uttar 
Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh and Tamil Nadu for comparative analysis of long run 
equilibrium for federal transfers involving time series econometrics. However, prior to analyze 
                                                 
1 The current resource gap between receipt and expenditure on revenue account is known as revenue deficit (RD), 
and the overall receipt-expenditure gap involving both revenue and capital accounts in government budget is gross 
fiscal deficit (GFD) on which the primary deficit is computed by less of interest payment. 
 3 
the stability of resource transfers, we now quickly look into the observed pattern of federal 
transfers for selected states over the study period of 30 years from 1980-81 to 2009-10. 
 
Pattern of federal transfers 
 
The centre-state resource transfers are characterized by statutory plus discretionary in 
nature, and the same are realized in three channels: Finance Commission recommendation for 
sharable central taxes as well as general purpose grants, Planning Commission grants for 
developmental plan expenditures and Central Ministerial grants for centrally sponsored 
schemes. Focusing on the positive analysis of distributional aspects of intergovernmental 
transfer patterns however highlight some political economy features of transfers such as the 
faulty design and implementation of a transfer system by the realm of political bargaining. The 
central ministries are often wished to influence the states outlays on selected items of 
expenditure using highly discretionary transfers, and also there are evidences that the Planning 
Commission transfers involve temporal variations (ref.). On the other hand, the working of 
statutory Finance Commissions towards the design of transfer system as well as the approach 
and methodology adopted by them has come in for criticism. Much of the policy discussions 
and research in this regard falls under the normative categorization as a remedy for horizontal 
imbalances, though there has been some analysis of equity outcomes that cuts across positive 
and normative concerns (ref.). We therefore review the observed trend of central transfers 
(DEVOL) to the selected states with their deficit situation and expenditure pattern over time. 
Notably, while devolution of central resources and revenue deficit of state are normalized by 
the state level output, a ratio of development (DEV) to non-development (NDEV) expenditures 
is considered mainly to recognize the statewide effectiveness for social and economic services. 
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Punjab 
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West Bengal 
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We found a falling trend of fiscal devolution except for Orissa and Uttar Pradesh over 
the period of last three decades. However, a serous fall in DEVOL-GSDP proportion is observed 
for Kerala, Punjab and Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal to some extent. Likewise, a serous level of 
RD-GSDP proportion is viewed in Kerala, Punjab and West Bengal, and that is varied between 3 
to 5 percentage points. All other states experience it as almost below 2 percent level. In spite of 
that the studied states are nearly same in one respect which is essentially the ratio of 
development to non-development expenditures. Clearly, a fall in the DEV/NDEV ratio implies 
that the states are unable to maintain their spending on social and economic development. 
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Alternatively, it might suggest that the states in general at subnational level are incurred a 
relatively higher non-development expenditure committed for administrative services, pension 
and interest payment. It is therefore the more central devolution of resources that indeed help 
states for effective expenditure on the development purposes. 
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Utter Pradesh 
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Madhya Pradesh 
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Tamil Nadu 
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Estimate of state to centre resource transfers and test for the long run stability 
 
In a federal country like India, whatever the funds accumulated as tax revenue in central 
resource pool are essentially originated from the activities of its constitutional states. However, 
the information on state specific resource transfers to the centre is not publicly recorded. Our 
endeavor here is to offer an indirect estimation of such transfers reasonably. In this modeling, 
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we start from the basic principle that national income (output) is a sum total of states income 
(output). In standard practice, it implies: if the tax to GDP ratio is , ct  then iGSDP x 
ct  gives the 
contribution by ith state to centre tax revenue in average term. Of course, the actual 
contribution will be different from this average value since the states are subject to unequal 
resource mobilization activities. Clearly, the state level relative performance should be taken as 
a weight ( iw ) to determine the actual contribution. In a priory sense, there may be two 
possible variables, namely per capita GSDP or state own tax effort that seem to be used for the 
weight.  Even so, the state tax to GSDP ratio is deemed as the most suitable one since it 
involves both income generating activity as well as revenue accumulation capability of the 
state2. 
………………………… 
 
Clearly, if the devolution of resource from centre to state is ciR , then )
s
i
c
i R  -(R  would be 
the net gain from federal transfers to ith state. 
 
Now, the question arises whether there is any stability in the pattern of federal 
transfers? The long run stability of transfers in econometric sense is examined by the test of 
cointegration between ciR  and 
s
iR  series. Our conclusion is that if 
c
iR  and 
s
iR  are cointegrated, 
there exists a long run equilibrium in the federal transfers system. In literature, however, the 
standard test involves in two-step procedures, and starts first by examining the unit root for 
each individual series of cR  and sR . Further, it is argued that the structural break in a series 
biases results toward non-rejection of null hypothesis of a unit root (Perron, 1989). Since, 
structural break in macroeconomic data is present in most of the countries including India 
(Uctum, et al., 2006; Hatekar and Dongre, 2005; Jha and Sharma, 2004; Raju, 2011; Wallack, 
2003) the usual tests such as augmented version of Dickey-Fuller test for unit root and Engle-
Granger test for cointegration seem to be misleading results. To deal with the problems, there 
are advanced approaches in econometric literate such as Zivot-Andrews test of unit root and 
Gregory-Hansen test of cointegration (Keho, 2010; Aslan and Taşdemir, 2009; Chang and Ho, 
2002; Uctum, et al., 2006; Jha and Sharma, 2004; Raju, 2011). These test procedures are 
essentially the modified version of standard unit root test and cointegration test that can deal 
with the unknown structural break by introducing dummy variables for drift change and/or 
slope change. Zivot and Andrews (1992) propose a test procedure in which the candidate break 
point (μ) is treated as an outcome of the estimation procedure deigned for a series tR with the 
generalized specification3 is: 
                                                 
2 It is of course the fact that state taxes are relatively inelastic and less buoyant, we observed a very high 
correlation between state own tax revenue and GSDP as 0.983 in India. 
3 The original version of Zivot-Andrews test involves thee models: A (only one dummy in the regression for drift 
shift), B (only one dummy in the regression for slope shift) and C (both drift shift and slope shift by two dummies in 
the regression). Nevertheless, the appropriate model may be based on the significance of dummy coefficient(s) in 
the regression. Here we start with the generalized form that is model C. 
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
=
++++++= −−
p
tmti1tst2dt1t
1m
eΔRσφRDβDβtR θγ ………………. (1)  
 
Here, sd D  and D are respective dummy variables for drift and trend shifts. The possible 
values for dummy variables can be summarized as: drift dummy equals 1 if t > μ and 0 
otherwise; slope dummy equals t – μ if 1 if t > μ and 0 otherwise. The null hypothesis of unit 
root with structural break in the series is that 1 φ = . Prior to estimate the above model specified 
in equation (1), there are two basic problems: determination of break date μ and choice of lag 
length p. So as to determine the break point in the series, Zivot-Andrews applied a sequential 
ADF test for equation (1) over the range of sample excluding the two extreme points of the data 
to search each possible break point. That is to say μ Є [2, T–1], where t = 1, 2, 3 … T. Therefore, 
by solving equation (1) for ADF test we get T–2 number of ADF statistics ( 1]-T [2, h  ,hτ  ), which 
are of course biased towards Dickey-Fuller -τ distribution since the model specified in (1) differs 
from the original ADF model (Zivot and Andrews, 1992). We select the break date (μ) associated 
with the value  τ ˆ that reject null hypothesis of unit root strongly4. That is to say the break point 
(μ) = inf( hτˆ ). Once the break point is given, we follow general-to-specific criterion proposed by 
Perron (1989) for selection of lag length. That is, we set 6pmax =  and keep reducing the lag until 
the null that the coefficients of last p lags are jointly significant towards the critical value of 1.60 
for t/F statistic in absolute term. Finally, given the break date and lag choice, the Zivot-Andrews 
model in equation (1) to be estimated for unit root test of .φˆ  Notably, for the cointegration 
analysis we have to run this test for both cR  and sR  series to find out whether they are 
integrated in the same order I(d). The Gregory and Hansen (1996a) version of cointegrating 
regression for cR  and sR  in general form of regime shift5 may be specified as: 
 
…………….. 
 
In this model, tD  is dummy variable, which takes value 1 if t > π and 0 otherwise. That is, 
11  and ba are the respective coefficients for drift and slope before break point (π), and 22  and ba   
are the corresponding changes after the break. We now estimate the cointegrating equation (2) 
by OLS for each possible break point in grid search procedure with the central seventy percent 
observations (Gregory and Hansen, 1996b: 557). That is to say π Є [0.15T, 0.85T] and we have 
to run regressions, which in number are the nearest integer of value [T – 0.3T]. Clearly, it 
provides the 
π
t ωˆ series for each possible π. Finally, the standard residual-based ADF test is 
applied for each tωˆ  series as follows: 
                                                 
4 We reject the H0: unit root, if τˆ  is less than the critical value from the asymptotic distribution reproduced by 
Zivot and Andrews (1992). 
5 Like Zivot-Andrews test, the original version of Gregory-Hansen test involves also thee models: 2 (level shift), 3 
(level shift with trend) and 3 (regime shift). All the models are modified from the original cointegration model 1, 
developed by Engle and Granger (1987). 
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Here the null of no cointegration is tested using the asymptotic critical values provided 
by Gregory and Hansen (1996a) for date-dependent ADF statistic [ADF*= inf ADF(π), where the 
break point is associated too]. 
 
Results and discussion on stability of federal financial transfers 
 
The stability of federal transfers system in long run to be achieved if both the forms of 
transfers, that is to say central devolution (centre to state) and state contribution (state to 
centre) are stationary and cointegrated. Prior to analyze this issue, we offer a comparative 
picture of the states with net gain/loss from federal transfers over time. Table 2 portrays the 
arrangement of states from looser to gainer for federal transfers in net basis (central devolution 
– state contribution). Further, the net transfer deems to be normalized either on output or on 
population at state level to arrive in the standard comparative analysis sine the states are 
essentially diverse in size. States are ranked on their average value of net transfer in two 
reference times: entire study period, that is 1980-81 to 2009-10, and current period covering 
last five years from 2005-06 to 2009-10. Interestingly, there is hardly any perceptible change for 
a state in the order of ranking between two reference times.  Of course, there is a change in the 
ranking between per capita and GSDP terms of net transfer. Nevertheless, all the special 
category states are net gainer from federal transfers, except for newly established state of 
Uttaranchal. In contrast, all the general category states are net looser, with the exception of 
Bihar and currently Orissa. There is indeed no signal in the fiscal devolution patterns toward 
financially unhealthy general category states observed earlier in table 1, such as Kerala, Punjab 
and West Bengal6. Albeit, the central resource pools are constantly welled-off by their resource 
mobilizations, the financial devolution patterns are failed to address any corrective measures in 
favor of these fiscally unhealthy states. 
 
Table 2: Rank of states as per net transfer (central devolution – state contribution) 
Net transfer normalized by GSDP Net transfer normalized by population 
1980-81 to 2009-10 2005-06 to 2009-10 1980-81 to 2009-10 2005-06 to 2009-10 
Karnataka Karnataka Goa Goa 
Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu Haryana Haryana 
Haryana Haryana Maharashtra Tamil Nadu 
Maharashtra Goa Tamil Nadu Karnataka 
Gujarat Kerala Karnataka Maharashtra 
Kerala Punjab Punjab Punjab 
Punjab Andhra Pradesh Kerala Kerala 
Andhra Pradesh Maharashtra Gujarat Gujarat 
Goa Gujarat Andhra Pradesh Andhra Pradesh 
Chattisgarh Rajasthan Chattisgarh Rajasthan 
Madhya Pradesh Chattisgarh Rajasthan Chattisgarh 
West Bengal Madhya Pradesh Madhya Pradesh West Bengal 
                                                 
6 The fact is as well true if we choose an alternative weight, namely per capita GSDP instead of tax to GSDP ratio. 
Ranking of the states as per net transfer with per capital GSDP weight is reported in appendix. As may be seen in 
table 2A, apart from the special category states excluding Uttaranchal, there are five general category states, 
namely Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Utter Pradesh gained from the federal transfers. 
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Rajasthan West Bengal West Bengal Madhya Pradesh 
Uttar Pradesh Uttar Pradesh Uttaranchal* Uttaranchal* 
Jharkhand Jharkhand Jharkhand Uttar Pradesh 
Uttaranchal* Uttaranchal* Uttar Pradesh Jharkhand 
Orissa Orissa Orissa Orissa 
Assam* Himachal Pradesh* Bihar Bihar 
Bihar Assam* Assam* Assam* 
Himachal Pradesh* Bihar Himachal Pradesh* Himachal Pradesh* 
Meghalaya* Meghalaya* Meghalaya* Jammu & Kashmir* 
Jammu & Kashmir* Jammu & Kashmir* Jammu & Kashmir* Meghalaya* 
Tripura* Tripura* Tripura* Tripura* 
Manipur* Sikkim* Manipur* Nagaland* 
Sikkim* Nagaland* Nagaland* Manipur* 
Nagaland* Manipur* Sikkim* Sikkim* 
Arunachal Pradesh* Arunachal Pradesh* Arunachal Pradesh* Mizoram* 
Mizoram* Mizoram* Mizoram* Arunachal Pradesh* 
*Special category states; Shaded states are net gainers from the federal transfers. 
 
Results on cointegration are under progress … 
 
Conclusions 
 
To be added ... 
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Appendix 
Table 2A: Rank of states as per net transfer with weight as per capita own output 
Net transfer in GSDP term Net transfer in per capita term 
1980-81 to 2009-10 2005-06 to 2009-10 1980-81 to 2009-10 2005-06 to 2009-10 
Goa Goa Goa Goa 
Haryana Haryana Haryana Haryana 
Maharashtra Maharashtra Maharashtra Maharashtra 
Punjab Gujarat Punjab Gujarat 
Gujarat Punjab Gujarat Punjab 
Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu Tamil Nadu 
Kerala Kerala Kerala Kerala 
Karnataka Karnataka Karnataka Karnataka 
Andhra Pradesh Andhra Pradesh Uttaranchal* Andhra Pradesh 
West Bengal West Bengal Andhra Pradesh Uttaranchal* 
Uttaranchal* Uttaranchal* West Bengal West Bengal 
Chattisgarh Rajasthan Chattisgarh Rajasthan 
Rajasthan Chattisgarh Rajasthan Chattisgarh 
Jharkhand Jharkhand Madhya Pradesh Jharkhand 
Madhya Pradesh Himachal Pradesh* Uttar Pradesh Orissa 
Uttar Pradesh Orissa Orissa Madhya Pradesh 
Orissa Madhya Pradesh Jharkhand Himachal Pradesh* 
Assam* Uttar Pradesh Assam* Uttar Pradesh 
Himachal Pradesh* Assam* Bihar Bihar 
Bihar Meghalaya* Himachal Pradesh* Assam* 
Meghalaya* Bihar Meghalaya* Meghalaya* 
Jammu & Kashmir* Tripura* Tripura* Tripura* 
Tripura* Jammu & Kashmir* Jammu & Kashmir* Jammu & Kashmir* 
Manipur* Nagaland* Manipur* Nagaland* 
Nagaland* Sikkim* Nagaland* Manipur* 
Sikkim* Manipur* Sikkim* Sikkim* 
Arunachal Pradesh* Arunachal Pradesh* Arunachal Pradesh* Mizoram* 
Mizoram* Mizoram* Mizoram* Arunachal Pradesh* 
*Special category states; Shaded states are net gainers from the federal transfers. 
 
